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ARGUMENT
Respondent Estate Landscape and Snow Removal, Inc.
("Estate") mischaracterizes the transaction between the
parties as a series of "separate jobs/'1 each constituting
"in essence"2 a separate contract.

This common but

transparent attempt to avoid the accord and satisfaction
defense is out of harmony not only with the law, but with
Estate's own evidence.
In its brief, Estate has the audacity to assign a job
number to each supposed "job,"3 although there is absolutely
no evidential basis in the record for doing so

on the

contrary, all the evidence shows that Estate itself treated
the relationship with Mountain Bell as a unitary contract.
First, there was a single written contract, which Estate
concedes set the terms as to all snow removal work to be
performed.4

By its terms, that contract contemplated snow

removal for an entire year, not just for a single occasion.5
1

Respondent's Brief, pp. 1-8.

2

Respondent's Brief, p. 3.

3

Respondent's Brief, p. 3.

4

Respondent's Brief, p. 3.

5

The contract (Exhibit 3, attached to Mountain Bell's
principal brief as Appendix D), provides: "Such services
shall commence under this Agreement on December 1, 1984, and
continue through and including November 31, 1985."
-1-

Second, there was a single bill for all the work done under
the contract at Alta, Utah, during the period from December
28, 1984 through April 1, 1985, when the snow season ended.6
That invoice was submitted after all the work was completed,
and although it itemized the services supposedly performed,
it stated the amount due as a single figure, $30,162.50.
Third, Estate's own ledger showed a single account for
Mountain Bell, which stated that same figure as the last
balance owing.7

Fourth, the demand letter from Estate's

attorney did not refer to multiple contracts, but to a "snow
removal contract," an "outstanding balance," an "outstanding
obligation," and an "outstanding account," each in the
singular.8

Finally, both the complaint and the amended

complaint referred to the agreement between the parties in
the singulcir.
In seeking to contort the facts of this case into the
mold of Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369
P.2d 296 (1962), Estate has conveniently ignored the
statement in Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609
(Utah 1985), that "a single claim, including both its
6

A more legible copy of the invoice (Exhibit 4) is
attached h€>reto as Attachment A.
7

Exhibit 5, attached hereto as Attachment B.

8

Exhibit 14.
-2-

disputed and undisputed elements, is unitary and not subject
to division so long as the whole claim is unliquidated,"
(emphasis added) (citing Air Van Lines Inc. v. Buster. 673
P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska 1983))•

Estate has also ignored the

compelling factual similarity among the case at bar, Marton.
diid Cove View Excavating & Construction Co.. Inc. v. Flynn.
758 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988).

Each of those cases involved

services performed on a contract, where the compensation
depended at least in part on the amount of time spent on the
job.

In each case, the defendant disputed the amount of time

claimed by the plaintiff, and tendered a rheck representing
what the defendant felt was proper payment for the whole job.
Neither the Supreme Court in Marton, nor the Court of Appeals
in Cove View, took the approach advocated by Estate in this
case, to sever the claims into two portions, one of which
represented the amount the defendants conceded was due, and
the other of which represented the "disputed" portion.
Rather, in both cases the courts specifically rejected the
same argument Estate is making in this case (that there were
multiple claims), and applied the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims.
In Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals. Inc., 758 P.2d 460
(Utah App. 1988), this Court followed the same reasoning in
holding that an accord and satisfaction occurred when an
-3-

employee cashed a check with the notation "in settlement of
net final wages from job 11967/Jubail."

The check included

the full amount of certain elements of compensation that the
employer conceded were due, but excluded any payment for
"uplifts," which the plaintiff claimed were owing as separate
items of compensation.

Although such claims could have been

severed in the manner sought by Estate in this case, this
Court held that the case involved "a single claim for
compensation," distinguishing Bennett v. Robinson's Medical
Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966) (which found
two separate claims for compensation).

758 P.2d at 462.

Cases from other jurisdictions have similarly rejected
claims that separate items on a single invoice for work under
a single contract can be treated as separate contracts to
avoid a finding of accord and satisfaction.

In Air Van Lines

Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska 1983), cited with
approval in both Marton and Cove View, the plaintiff moving
company had sent an itemized invoice following completion of
a moving job.

Defendant objected to two of the four items on

the invoice (the charges for overtime hours and for per diem
and travel), but conceded the remaining charges (for regular
time and for packing materials).

Defendant's full payment

check represented the conceded charges only.

The court held

that cashing the check constituted an accord an satisfaction
-4-

of the entire invoice, specifically rejecting the same
argument that Estate makes in this case (that payment of the
undisputed portion of the bill is not an accord and
satisfaction as to the disputed portion.)
In Flaael v. Southwest Clinical Physiatrists, P.C., 157
Ariz. 196, 755 P.2d 1184 (1988), the plaintiff, a physical
therapist, agreed to work for the defendant as an independent
contractor.

His agreed compensation depended in part on the

revenue collected by the defendant.

When the defendant

decided not to renew the contract, a dispute arose as to
whether the plaintiff was entitled to a percentage of the
existing accounts receivable or of the amounts actually
collected prior to termination of his contract.

The court

held that cashing the defendant's full payment check, which
represented the amount the defendant conceded was due under
its interpretation of the contract, was an accord and
satisfaction of the whole dispute, notwithstanding that there
were two distinct claims (based on revenues received before
and after termination).

The court concluded: "[Plaintiff's]

claims to revenues received before and after his termination
are not wholly independent claims arising out of separate
transactions."

Id. at 1190.9

9

The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the great disparity between the amount paid ($2,803.00) and
the amount claimed ($37,810.00) indicated that the plaintiff
-5-

In Graffam v. Geronda, 304 A.2d 76 (Me. 1973), the
plaintiff delivered 500 cases of oil to defendant.

Defendant

sold 42 cases, and returned the remaining 458 cases to
plaintiff, with a check representing full payment only for
the cases sold.

The check bore the notation: "Full and final

payment for product received December 18, 1969."

The court

held that cashing the check created an accord and
satisfaction, specifically concluding that there was but a
single claim.
Legal scholars acknowledge the principles set forth in
the cases previously cited.

For example, 1 Williston on

Contracts § 129 (3d ed. 1957) states:
Not infrequently, though a claim is unliquidated or the
subject of a bona fide and reasonable dispute, it is
conceded that at least a certain amount is due. While
it would appear that in paying this conceded part of the
claim, the debtor was merely doing what he was
previously bound to do, the law looks upon an
unliquidated or disputed claim as a whole and does not
attempt to set a value upon it, or to define the extent
of th€* debtor's legal obligation. . . . By the weight
of authority, the payment of the amount admittedly due
will support a promise to discharge the whole claim.

could not have agreed to accept the lesser amount in full
settlement. The court observed that
[defendant] clearly expressed its intent that the check
was paid as a settlement in full. It may be that
[plaintiff] did not assent and there was no actual
meeting of the minds. However, the making of a contract
in this circumstance does not require such an actual
meeting of the minds. As a matter of law, an accord and
satisfaction occurred when [plaintiff] cashed the check.
755 P.2d at 1190-91.
-6-

See also, 15 Williston on Contracts § 1854 (3d ed. 1972).
In Comment (c) to Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 74
(1981), it is stated thus:
An undisputed obligation may be unliquidated, that is
uncertain or disputed in amount. . . . An admission by
the obligor that a minimum amount is due does not
liquidate the claim even partially unless he is
contractually bound to the admission. . . . If there
are no circumstances of unfair pressure or economic
coercion and a disputed item is closely related to an
undisputed item, the two are treated as making up a
single unliquidated claim; and payment of the amount
admittedly due can be consideration for a promise to
surrender the entire claim.
See also. Annotation, "Payment of undisputed amount or
liability as consideration for discharge of disputed amount
or liability," 112 A.L.R. 1219, 1225-36 (1938).
Corbin provides two illustrations where an unliquidated
claim comprised of several distinct elements may be resolved
by a single accord and satisfaction:
(2) A rate of payment per unit of performance may have
been agreed upon by the parties; but the number of units
may be undetermined or disputed. It may have been
agreed that A shall be paid $5 per day for his service,
but the number of days that he has worked is
undetermined or disputed. . . . The amount due is
unliquidated and doubtful; and a mutual agreement fixing
the amount is an enforceable contract, whether it is a
substituted contract or an accord executory.
. . . .

(4) The terms of the contract or the meaning to be
given them may be doubtful and disputed. The
performance rendered may be definite and certain, but
the amount to be paid therefor is in dispute, whether
that amount was a lump sum or a sum to be determined at
a rate per unit. . . . According to the weight of
authority, if the debtor tenders payment of the exact
amount that he has admitted to be due, making it clear
-7-

that he offers it as satisfaction in full of the
creditor's claim, the acceptance of the tendered payment
operates as accord and satisfaction of the whole.
6 Corbin on Contracts § 1290, pp. 168-70 (1962).
The present case provides an ideal illustration of the
principles enunciated above.

There is no dispute that Estate

performed some snow removal work at Alta, Utah, pursuant to a
contract that provided for payment on a per unit basis. 10
There was, however, a genuine, substantial dispute over the
amount charged.

Mountain Bell's tender of payment of the

difference between the disputed portion and the total bill
was intended to resolve the entire dispute.11

That intent

was clearly conveyed to Estate,12 and Estate understood or

10

The contract specified $85 per removal, or $55 [per
hour] for use of a front end loader. See Exhibit 3, attached
to Mountain Bell's principal brief as Appendix D.
11

Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 43-44.

12

Mountain Bell's letter (Exhibit 6, attached to
Mountain Bell's principal brief as Appendix F) offered the
check as ''payment in full for satisfaction of contracted
services." It did not state that the check represented
payment for undisputed services. Thus the case at bar is
factually distinguishable from Dillman, where the debtor's
notation (that the check represented "the amount in full to
complete recent buy back on your account") was vague enough
that the reviewing court held that "the trial court could
believe . . . that the check was in no way related to
anything other than payment for items actually bought back by
appellant." 369 P.2d at 298. There is no rational way to
read Mountain Bell's letter as being similarly vague or
limited.

-8-

should have understood the import of it. 13

Under these

circumstances, applicable legal authority compels the
conclusion that there was an accord and satisfaction when
Estate negotiated the check.
Not only is Estate's position contrary to recent case
law in Utah and other jurisdictions, it is also contrary to
sound policy.

Under Estate's theory, one who makes the awful

mistake of identifying those portions of an itemized invoice
that are disputed runs the risk that the court will treat the
disputed items as being under a separate contract or
contracts, thereby preventing the application of accord and
satisfaction to resolve the whole bill.

Thus in order to

avoid such a result and to enhance the chance of achieving an
accord and satisfaction, the debtor should not specify what
is disputed nor provide any information as to how or why the
amount being offered in full settlement was calculated, but
should simply advise the creditor that the whole bill is
disputed.

Better yet, one should pick an arbitrary, round

figure to offer in settlement, so there would be no means of
inferring from the amount offered what was disputed and what

13

Mountain Bell's letter specifically warned Estate:
"If you are not willing to accept that sum, $8613.00 in full
satisfaction of the sums due. DO NOT negotiate the check, for
upon your negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter
as fully paid."
-9-

was not.

Such an approach makes no sense from a commercial

or a legal standpoint.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the only contention raised by Estate as a
basis for denying the accord and satisfaction defense, that
each "job" of snow removal work constituted a separate
contract, is without merit both factually and legally.
Estate's other points are so lacking in substance and merit
that they do not deserve further attention.

Estate's

conclusion that the trial court's decision was "well within
the bounds of his discretion"14 even misstates the applicable
standard of review.

On the undisputed evidence in the record

of this case, Mountain Bell is entitled to a finding that
there was cin accord and satisfaction, and on that basis the
action should be dismissed with prejudice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 7 day of December, 1988.
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

Floyd6*A. Jensen, Attorney

14 Respondent's Brief, p. 12.
-10-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Respondent were mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following on the 2-^^day of December,
1988:
Lowell V. Summerhays, Esq.
David D. Loreman, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
480 East 6400 South
Murray, Utah 84107
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ATTACHMENTS
A.

Invoice from Estate to Mountain Bell

B.

Estate's ledger for Mountain Bell account

ATTACHMENT A

Invoice from Estate to Mountain Bell

INVOICE

"Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists"
3089 Little Cottonwood Road
Sandy, Utah 84092

942-5431
INVOICI. D A H

Ht. B.ll
6
4747 North 7th Str..t
#212
Pho.nix. AZ. 8S014
Attn: Jan. P0#06110106
Alt* Canyon

~4UANi!jy

1
1

3
3
3

.B«fNT

3765

:-S&SQBP1V

Snow
with
Snow
Snow
Snow
Snow
Snow
Snow
with
..Snow

J.

04/01/85

INVOICI. NUMM.lt

Removal
plows.
Removal
Remove!
removal
Removal
Removal
Removal
plow*.
Removal
1 - 30 DAY*

with front-end loader & 3
18 Hre
12-26
Service
Service
Service
<2>PM
<1> AM
Service
<2> AM - (1) PM
Service
<2> AM - <1> PM
with front-end loader & 2
10 Hre.
Service
(2) ftM t (3) PM
31 • 60 0AYS

• 1 . 90 DAYS

dumps u n i t e
thru 12-34*64
12-31-84
1-1-85
1-8-83
1-9-83
1-21-83

dump u n i t e
1-26-83
1-29-85
OVIft $0 DAYS

Net 10 Days.
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU.
- 1

39*0.00
S3 . •"C

25.3. C-Q.
255.00
1650.00
425.00

•o
it
"Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists

3089 Little Cottonwood Road
Sandy, Utah 84092
r

Mt. B«ll
8
4747 North 7th Strast
#212
Pho«nix, AZ. 85014
Attn: J«n« PO#06110106
Alta Canyon

QUANTITY

4
2
6
3
3
6
4
1
|~

r

-

CURRINT

942-5431

04/01/83

DESCRIPTION
-

Snow
Snow
Snow
Snow
Snow
Snow
Snow
Snow
with
i Sn<pw

Ramoval
Ramoval
Ramoval
Removal
Ramoval
Ramoval
Ramoval
Ramovai
plow*.
Ramovai
1 • 30 DAYS

",.'•'-'"*•"

>

-

AMOUNT

Sarvica <1> AM - <3) PM 1-30-83
Sarvlca <1> AM - <1> PM 2-1-83
Sarvica <3> AM - (3) PM 2-4-83
Sarvica (3) AM - <2> PM 2-3-83
Sarvica <3> AM - <2> PM 2-6-83
2-7-83
Sarvica <4> AM - (2) PM
Sarvica (3) AM - <1) PM 2-8-83
with front-and loadar & 2 dump units
- 24 Hrs. 2--11 'thru 2-12-83
with front-and loadar & 2 dump units
[

31 -60 DAYS

ei • »0 DAY8

340.00
170.00 !
310.00
423 .£$.
423.00
. .SlQtQO...
340.00 !
|

3960i66" !

OVER SO DAYS

TOTAi

v

Net 1 0 Days.
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU.
- 2 -

3763

{

INVOICE

O
"Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists"
3089 Little Cottonwood Road
Sandy, Utah 84092
Mt. B a l i

942-5431

a

4747 North 7th Straat
#212
Phoanix, AZ. 65014
Attn: Jana P0#06110106
Alta Canyon
L
QUANTITY

|

AMOUNI

INSCRIPTION

with plows. (Avalanche) 18.S Hra.
Snow Removal Sarvica <1> AM - <1) PM
Snow Removal Service <2> AM - U> PM
Snow Removal with front-end loader and
16.5 Hra.
with plows.
1
Snow Removal Service
(2) PM
2
1 Snow Removal Service <1> AM - <1> PM
2
Snow Removal Service <2) AM
2
| Snow Ramoval Service
<2) PM
2
?CURRENT I flnnu Ramoval Service
<2>
AM
• 1 -90 DAYS
31 -60 DAYS
1.30**Y* 1|
1

1
2
3

2-13-85
2-15-65
2-16-85
2 dump unita
2-20-85
2-21-85
2-22-85
2-23-85
2-25-85
2-26-85
0VIR 90 OAYf

V

Nat 1 o Days.
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU.
- 3 -

3052.50
17ft«0jCL.

255.00
2722.50
170.00
X2A*Q£L-

170.00
170.00
TOTAI

O
"Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists"
3089 Little Cottonwood Road
Sandy, Utah 84092

L

&
2

1
2
6
h^%,WMIW

INVOH i D A M

Mt. Ball
d
4747 North 7th Straat
#212
Phoenix, AZ. 65014
Attn: Jon* P0#06110106
Alta Canyon

04/01/85

3765

oescniFMON

QUANTITY

3
6
3

942-5431

Snow Ramoval
Snow Ramoval
Snow Ramoval
Snow Ramoval
Snow Removal
Snow removal
with plows
Snow Ramoval
Snow Ramoval
. SnpkL
ip Ramoyal
i % ^ YS

255.00

3-2-85
3-3-63
3-4-83
3-6-83
3-7-83
with front-and loadar and 2 dump unit*
12.3 Kra. 3-8 thru 3-9-85
3-10-83
Sarvica
(2) PM
Sarvica
C3> AM - ( 3 ) PM 3-11-65
-S*r*ic*
<3) AM - <2? PM , ?-l2-?3
Sarvica
Sarvlca
Sarvica
Sarvica
Sarvlca

<1> AM
(3) AM
(2) AM
<3> AM
<2> AM

3 J -SO DAYS

-

<2>
<3)
<1>
<2>

PM
PM
PM
PM

61 - 9 0 DAYS

OVIft 90 DAYS

S1WW
255.00
170.00
2062.50
510.00
fOTAI

L

Not 1 0 D a y s .
AA
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU. ' A '
- 4

o
"Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists"
3089 Little Cottonwood Road
Sandy, Utah 84092
r

QUANTITY

1
2

3
3
3

1

1
•

2

3
1

INVOICI D A K

Mt. Ball
8
4747 North 7th Straat
#212
Phoanix, AZ. 65014
Attn: Jan* P0#06110106
Alta Canyon

I

942-5431

04/01/85

i

5CURflCNT

1 • 30 OAYS

31-0OOAY8

1

& 2 dump u n i t *
3-13-85
3-14-85
PM 3 - 1 6 - 8 5
PM 3 - 1 8 - 8 5
PM 3 - 2 0 - 6 3
PM 3 - 2 2 - 8 5
PM 3 - 2 5 - 8 5
3-26-85
PM 3 - 2 7 - 6 5

f l - 9 0 DAYS

OViMODAVt,

-*
V

3765

AMOUNT

DCSCRIPfJON

1 Snow r e m o v a l w i t h f r o n t - e n d l o a d e r
9 Hr«.
' with plowa.
<2) AM
1 Snow Removal S e r v i c e
<1> AM - <2>
Snow Removal S e r v i c e
<2> AM - <1>
' Snow Ramovel S e r v i c e
Removal
<2)
AM - ( 1 )
Snow
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
i
<1> AM - <1>
Snow Removal S e r v i c e
( 1 ) AM - ( 2 )
Snow Removal S e r v i c e
( 1 ) AM
Snow Removal S e r v i c e
J Snow Removal -S|arvlca ,. ( 3 ) AM - <2JL

irjvoM i NUMiii n

__

Net 1 0 Days.
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU.
- 5 -

1465.QO. .
170.00
25$.00 i
255.00 I

roi AI
our

170.00
2M(fia
65.00
425.00

'
!
|
|
J

-o
"Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists"
3089 Little Cottonwood Road
Sandy, Utah 84092

L

1

CUKBINT

INVOH.I NUMtUM

Mt. Ball
8
4747 North 7th S t r H t
#212
Phoanix, AZ. 85014
Attn: Jana P0#06110106
Alta Canyon

04/01/85

3765

DfSClUPriON

QUANTITY

2

942-5431

Snow Removal Sarvica <2) AM
3-29-65
Snow Removal with front-arid loadar & 2 dumps units
with plows.
7.0 Hra
04-01-85

\ > 30 PAYS

31 CO DAYS

CI -SO DAYS

OVIR BO DAYS

Net 1 0 Days.
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU.
- 6 -

170.00
1155.00

ATTACHMENT B

Estate's ledger for Mountain Bell account

11ML
•#/

\%

pr

r

ml

pr
\h

V
1

tn-r

^

EH
LIT

r 1

p»

&*u*

Ar
^ /

i

TE

i

INVOICE t J

/

1 S*/r,/

*

\&/j£>

/

\j3f/

..

DEBIT

?^*-

CREDIT 1
A

7

ACCOUNT BALANCE

?77f f
—o

?/7f^

/o

^S£.±r*2
Jfcsr?
l

3£c»- '

1 &fo
H

'

•^Sf^

fro*!

1| # /

p:

1
70*-.
*?<?3<r ^

-

7o **

^/5-

MZ
1pL

7

l

3f9?
1 -^-5^

\%

*/*£"
^

1

Ih^v

w.
J
EI

-e^.T-

1

0

-

|4S/

c&/??cZZ.
J^str^

W'os-v

p

1

4oo**.

/S2>£"A

^zj1.

_

I

„

